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Using Social Network Analysis to Combat Counterfeiting  
 
Abstract 
Counterfeiting undoubtedly produces great harm to companies and the society. This paper 
presents a study on the application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to combating this problem. 
The supply chain can be viewed as a network of parties involved in delivering value to 
consumers. Normally, SNA is used to analyze relationships between people. In this study, it is 
utilized to analyze supply chains for identification of parties that are likely to be involved in 
counterfeiting activities. After identifying the suspects in a supply chain, the company can deter 
and detect counterfeiting by tightening surveillance on these parties. The feasibility of using 
SNA as an anti-counterfeiting tool is investigated in a case study, the findings of which indicate 
that SNA can effectively help companies to prevent sources of counterfeit products from 
infiltrating into the supply chain. Problematic parties can be identified by characterizing the 
following features: high degree of centrality, high closeness of centrality and high betweenness 
of centrality.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, counterfeiting has become a serious economic problem around the world. 
Counterfeiting is the act of imitating or copying other products. The imitated or copied products 
are arguably the same as the original ones, but they are sold at a fraction the price of the original 
ones (Hung, 2003). Because of technological advances, problems of counterfeiting worsened as 
counterfeiters gain the advantage with the wide adoption of the Internet and customers now 
purchase products in a product-unseen fashion as well as a seller-unseen fashion (Henderson, 
2001; Bastia, 2002). Counterfeit products affect the brand value and equity of brand owners. 
According to the MIT Center for International Studies, counterfeiting is estimated to be 15% to 
20% of all products produced in China and such products account for around 8% of China’s 
annual GDP (Morrison, 2012). Recent statistics indicated that counterfeit products caused global 
losses of about US$654.38 billion (Havocscope, 2012), a huge damage to the development of 
global economy. 
A range of technologies has been introduced to combat counterfeiting problems (Hopkins et al., 
2003). Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) based anti-counterfeiting solutions have been 
widely reported in literature (Ting et al., 2011; Kwok et al., 2010; Lehtonen et al., 2008; Wong et 
al., 2006). Generally, RFID technology combats counterfeiting in two ways: (i) item 
identification and (ii) traceability of an item’s trail of transactions in its supply chain. However, 
these solutions are reactive because they can only detect fakes after the latter have infiltrated into 
the supply chain. In today’s business environment, since companies have to deal with 
counterfeiting threats that have become more complex and debilitating, there is a need to shift 
from reactive to proactive countermeasures (Spink, 2011).  
Social Network Analysis (SNA), a computational network theory in visualizing social 
relationships, is freshly introduced in supply chain management (Knoke and Yang, 2008). In 
general, supply chain data is inputted into a simulation software package and network analysis 
results are derived to visualize knowledge networks within the supply chain, to monitor 
knowledge flows and to identify the nodes of a network that accumulate knowledge (Borgatti 
and Li., 2009). Inspired by these approaches, SNA can arguably be applied as a proactive anti-
counterfeiting strategy. By using it to analyze the transaction records of counterfeit products, 
SNA can assist in identifying relationships between supply chain parties so as to detect likely 
problematic parties.  
In this study, SNA is adopted to analyze the relationship and performance of a supply chain 
utilizing the graphical network theory. Network analysis characterizes relationships between 
different nodes of a network by generating centrality coefficients of nodes and by using network 
diagrams to visualize the connectedness of nodes (Cockcroft, 2010). The technique is performed 
to identify likely problematic entities in a network, along with estimates of each party’s 
possibility of being a counterfeit source. This study is the first of its kind in adopting SNA to 
combat counterfeiting. A case study is presented to illustrate the feasibility of applying SNA to 
visualize and analyze the logistics flow of the supply chain of counterfeit products, as well as its 
effectiveness for identifying suspicious parties. 
2. Current Anti-counterfeiting Technologies 
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2.1 Counterfeit Products 
Counterfeiting refers to fraudulent imitation or facsimile of something valuable. It is an offense 
when the producer of these imitated items has intent to defraud, passing them as genuine and to 
take advantage from them (Burton, 2007). Producers of counterfeit products always benefit from 
the fraudulent act because their products can be sold at high price while their costs are relatively 
low. The first cases of brand counterfeiting appeared about five decades ago. The phenomenon 
was a minor problem at that time because only a few manufacturers of high-value products (such 
as textile, jewelry and accessories) were affected in such cases (Elif, 2010). Since then, 
counterfeit products have proliferated and rampaged through both less and well developed 
countries (Matos et al., 2007). 
2.2 Challenges of Preventing and Detecting Counterfeit Products 
The root cause of counterfeits is the chance to earn profit and the trade-off of risk and reward 
that favors illegal activity (DuPont, 2010). Lax or nonexistent legislation and weak penalty 
enforcement of most governments are the main impediments to anti-counterfeiting. As a result, 
activities of counterfeit manufacturing and distribution have increased rapidly. Recently, 
increased counter-measures have been made in countries with serious counterfeiting problems. 
However, it is still challenging to detect and prevent counterfeiting; the key issues of addressing 
these problems are summarized in Table 1. It can be argued that tightened law enforcement and 
the use of anti-counterfeit technologies are the main solutions to combat counterfeiting activities.  
Table 1 
Key issues concerning the detection and prevention of counterfeiting 
 Key Issue Description 
1. Legislation on counterfeit products 
is usually imprecise and 
fragmented, leading to 
proliferation of criminal offences 
(Gabara and Krause, 2003) 
Counterfeiting is serious in many developing countries 
such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc, 
in which most of them do not understand the 
importance of fighting against counterfeiting, letting 
alone to have legislation that address the issue. In some 
cases, the manufacture of counterfeits is declared as 
criminal offence without the law being enforced, while 
it is even treated as a legitimate business in some of the 
developing counties. 
2. Few countries regard  
counterfeiting as a serious 
criminal offence because they do 
not recognize the full extent of the 
adverse economic and social 
impacts of the act (The Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce and the 
Retail Council of Canada, 2007) 
The judiciary of many countries does not recognize 
counterfeiting as an “economic crime”, leading to the 
lax enforcement to deter and prevent the corresponding 
business in the countries. With the adverse economic 
impacts like lowering the confidence of investment 
made by brand owners and hampering the countries’ 
export to other countries, the judiciary of these 
countries should proclaim counterfeiting as a criminal 
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act and set legislation against the issue. 
3. The customs authority does not 
have sufficient resources to detect 
and prevent counterfeit products 
(Gabara and Krause, 2003) 
It is difficult for the law enforcement authority to detect 
and intercept whether the items are counterfeit or not as 
they are scattered after import. Thus, more resources 
are required to deal with the problem. 
4. Imposing high levels of import 
tariffs and excise taxes on luxury 
goods, alcohol and tobacco 
increases the incentive for 
producing counterfeit goods (Pike, 
2000) 
Prices of counterfeit products are often slightly lower 
than that of the real products. Without having to pay for 
taxes such as import tariffs and excise taxes, in 
comparison to the production of authentic goods, the 
marginal profit of the counterfeit manufacturing is 
therefore significantly higher, creating great incentive 
for people to engage in counterfeit business. 
5. The resources government deploys 
on anti-counterfeiting are often 
limited as a country typically 
emphasizes on other types of high-
margin illicit issues (Henderson, 
2001) 
Without having enough police force resources spent on 
combating fraud, together with the grey areas in anti-
counterfeiting laws and regulations, loopholes exists 
that encourages the thriving of counterfeiting business. 
6. Businesses succeed in criminal 
activities (Gabara and Krause, 
2003) 
With sophisticated industry technologies (e.g. 
photocopying and printing technologies) and 
manufacturing equipment, counterfeiters can easily 
imitate not only physical products in the market, but 
also the corresponding packaging and labels in mass 
inexpensively. In some cases, counterfeiters may even 
use genuine labels and packaging materials from 
authorized but unscrupulous suppliers in order to make 
the counterfeits look like the real products. 
 
2.3 Existing Approaches to Prevent and Detect Counterfeit Products 
Most available strategies and technologies are introduced to manufacturers and brand owners to 
authenticate products in order to detect counterfeits. Some of them are very simple, while others 
are very sophisticated and highly secure. The level of sophistication mainly depends on the cost 
and applications, whereas the areas of implementation range from product packaging to 
individual products (Power, 2009). For example, high-value collectible items, such as artworks 
and antiques, require more sophisticated techniques to detect fakes because of the high potential 
loss caused by counterfeit items.  
To address counterfeiting problems, several technologies with different security measures have 
been developed. The primary purpose of these technologies is to facilitate product authentication; 
whereas their secondary purpose is to act as deterrent to counterfeiters who consider the 
difficulty and costs involved. Product authentication is one of the common anti-counterfeiting 
technologies widely adopted in industry (Lehtonen et al., 2008). It achieves the anti-
counterfeiting function in a physical manner. Additional tools are available to stakeholders 
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ascertaining the genuineness of products. Generally, these technologies can be classified into five 
categories: overt (visible) technology, covert (hidden) technology, machine-readable technology, 
serialization / track and trace technology and forensic technology.  
(a) Overt (visible) technology 
Overt technology allows end users to confirm the identity of a package (Power, 2009). It can be 
visible and judged with naked eyes. Examples of this approach include holograms, optically 
variable devices, color shifting security inks and films. 
(b) Covert (hidden) technology 
Covert technology facilitates the brand owner to detect counterfeit items but the identifier cannot 
be visualized with naked eyes (Power, 2009). Special reading devices or equipment are usually 
required for identification and verification. Typically, the identifiers are invisible under visible 
spectrum, but they are visible under an excitation light. Examples of this technology include 
chemically altered dyes, invisible printing, digital watermarks, laser coding, ultraviolet (UV) ink, 
infrared (IR) ink, and synthetic molecular markers. 
(c) Machine-readable technology 
Machine-readable technology can be either overt or covert, but authentication must be processed 
by equipment. Speedy and error proof results can be expected without human intervention. 
Examples of this technology include RFID tag, watermark magnetic, and hologram with 
magnetic signature. 
 
(d) Serialization / Track and trace technology 
Serialization / track and trace technology refers to identification systems such as RFID 
technology and bar code systems. Normally, they provide the identification of products, assets, 
documents or people and thus tracking and tracing. Because of their identification functions, they 
are widely adopted to facilitate the operation of information system in different areas such as 
inventory management of manufacturing, receiving management of warehousing, distribution 
management of transportation and so forth (Ilie-Zudor et al., 2010). Normally, they store product 
information like product name, lot number, manufacture day and so on, all of which are recorded 
via the supply chain until they are consumed. 
(e) Forensic techniques 
Forensic techniques refer to high-technology solutions which need laboratory testing or other 
dedicated tools to test the item’s authenticity. They are classified as covert technologies, 
examples of which are chemical taggants, DNA taggants, and isotope ratios. 
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2.4 Limitations of Existing Approaches 
At present, the usual approach to combat counterfeiting is to use the techniques introduced in 
Section 2.3 to authenticate the end product. However, these solutions are not preventive 
measures against counterfeiting. Moreover, with advancement of technology, many of these anti-
counterfeiting methods can be easily imitated eventually, reducing their potency in combating 
the counterfeit problem. Table 2 summarizes the strengths and limitations of the existing anti-
counterfeiting approaches. 
Table 2 Strengths and limitations of existing anti-counterfeiting approaches 
Approach Strengths Limitations 
Overt technology  Difficult and 
expensive to copy 
 Simple to implement 
 Smart product 
packaging 
 Requires knowledge in detecting the 
visual features and distinguishing the 
authenticity of the item in an effective 
manner 
Covert technology  Requires specialist 
knowledge to detect 
or mimick  
 Possible to reverse engineer the covert 
technology by examining specimens of 
the product 
 Possible to produce identical or similar 
security mark by emitting light of the 
same wavelength range and putting the 
mark on the counterfeit product  
Machine-readable 
technology 
 Eliminates the 
problem of 
inconsistent manual 
verification 
 Supports high speed 
and large scale 
detection  
 Expensive  
 Possible to reverse engineer the 
technology by examining a specimens of 
the product 
 
Serialization/ 
Track and trace 
technology 
 Allows products to be 
tracked the 
manufacturing points 
to designated 
distribution points 
 Enables supply chain 
visualization for 
product 
authentication (Kwok 
et al., 2010) 
 Expensive to develop the track and trace 
platform /infrastructure   
 Requires full participation of supply 
chain parties 
Forensic 
technology 
 Robust and effective 
for item identification 
 Relatively secure 
against imitation 
 Not possible to broadly apply to markets 
and end-users because of the dedicated 
knowledge and equipment required and 
their high cost 
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 Costly when licensing fees and the 
equipment costs are taken into 
consideration 
 
Anti-counterfeiting technologies have been developed to be implemented in areas ranging from 
product packaging to the product itself. While some of these solutions involve using tags as 
identifiers of products, others use physical or chemical markers for identification. Product 
packaging authentication is not foolproof as the solution is easy to imitate. Security devices 
alone can only facilitate detection of counterfeit products, they do not prevent supply of these 
fake items.  
Kwok et al. (2008) and Bastia (2002) suggest that tracking and tracing movements of products in 
a supply chain is a more effective approach to anti-counterfeiting. The traditional solutions 
cannot do this because using them to collect product flow is difficult and labor intensive. 
Moreover, some of these solutions are likely to be neutralized soon, as many of the formerly 
“advanced” technologies have quickly found widespread applications today. 
Kwok et al. (2010) propose a more proactive solution that involves the use of a counterfeit 
network analyzer (CNA) based on RFID technology and EPC networks. It is an automatic 
information sharing network that can visualize distribution of fraudulent products by analyzing 
information captured in EPC networks. The CNA detects entities that are very likely to have 
involved in distributing suspicious items and the source of these items.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
In this study, Social network analysis (SNA) is used to analyze interactions between 
organizations in a supply chain so as to identify parties that are very likely to be involved in 
counterfeiting activities. The SNA methodology consists of three main stages: (i) describing the 
set of actors of the network; (ii) characterizing the matrix (or relationships) between actors; and 
(iii) analyzing the network structure of the data matrix. 
The first step of SNA consists of describing the actors of the network. SNA studies connections 
among nodes in a network. In a network an actor is represented by a node and relationships 
between actors are represented by edges (Allesina et al., 2010; Raghavan and Viswanadham, 
2010; Kerbache and Smith, 2004). Actors may refer to individuals, organizations, or even 
countries, whereas edges may represent transactions, communication, friendship, collaboration, 
or trade (Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Christopher, 1992). In identifying relationships between supply 
chain parties for counterfeit products distribution, the supply chain data (i.e. transaction records 
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of counterfeit products) can be viewed as actors in the network of an organization that delivers 
value from the first involved party to the end consumer in this study. 
The second step of SNA consists of identifying the existence of flows of information between 
actors or, in other words, the demand (receiving information) and supply (providing information) 
of information between supply chain parties. This information can be collected through track-
and-trace technology like RFID or barcode (Kwok et al., 2010). Data collected are recorded in 
the information flow matrix as elaborated by Brinkerhoff (2004) and Marsden (1990). With the 
matrix showing the supply of information between actors, the network structure can be evaluated 
and analyzed in the next step.  
The final step of SNA is to analyze the network structure of data matrix via the measurement of 
degree of centrality, betweenness of centrality, and closeness of centrality. The network can help 
the user to understand how the counterfeit distribution is formed (i.e. which supply chain party 
has the highest possibility to be a counterfeiter). More discussion on construction of network 
structure is depicted below. 
 
3.2 Constructing Network Coefficients 
A network structure can be evaluated by attributes known as network coefficients. Two 
commonly used categorizes of network attributes are network-level coefficients and node-level 
coefficients (Benta, 2005). 
3.2.1 Network-level Coefficients 
Network-level coefficients are used to compare performance of networks with different 
structures and topologies, or to study changes in network performance over time (Kilduff and 
Tsai, 2003). The SNA implemented in this study does not involve measurement of network-level 
coefficients. 
 
3.2.2 Node-level Coefficients 
Node-level coefficients measure the relative importance, role and effects of different nodes 
within the network. In other words, they reflect the status (relationship) and connectivity of each 
node within the network. Three node-level coefficients, or centrality coefficients, are introduced 
below: 
(a) Degree Centrality 
The node that connects with the largest number of other nodes is called the central actor as it 
interacts with most other actors (Liu, 2011). The degree centrality of a node measures the 
9 
 
1
)()(  g
ndnC iiD
number of interactions (edges) the node has with others. This coefficient can be broken down 
into in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality. In-degree centrality measures the number of 
ties directed to the node (see Figure 1a), whereas out-degree centrality measures the number of 
ties that the node directs to others (see Figure 1b). Degree centrality can be determined using Eq. 
(1), in which degree centrality – CD(ni) – of node ni ,  equals the degrees of a node that refers to 
the number of edges – d(ni) – it connects, normalized with the maximum degrees (g – 1) of all 
nodes in the network. 
 
                               (1) 
 
 
 
(a)                                                               (b) 
Figure 1(a) In-degree Centrality (b) out-degree Centrality 
 
(b) Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality is defined as the sum of distances to or from all other nodes. Distance refers 
to the shortest path link between two nodes (Freeman, 1979). If a node interacts easily with many 
other nodes, its total distance to all other nodes will be shorter. Eq. (2) shows the formula for 
determining closeness centrality of ni , in which d(ni , nj) denotes the shortest distance between 
node ni and node nj. 
 
(2) 
 
Similar to degree centrality, closeness centrality can be decomposed into in-closeness centrality 
and out- closeness centrality; in-closeness centrality measures the number of ties directed to the 
node, out-closeness centrality measures the number of ties that the node directs to others. 
 
(c) Betweenness Centrality 
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Betweenness centrality is defined as the level of control. The level of control a node has on 
connections (flows) in the network is determined by the node’s actual or potential intermediary 
value to all other nodes of the network. It involves the determination of the shortest paths among 
all pairs of nodes. A node with a relatively high score of betweenness centrality has a high 
probability that it is on a randomly chosen shortest path. This type of node is more powerful than 
others because more parties will depend on it to have interactions with others (Freeman, 1977). 
Betweenness centrality is determined by Eq. (3). 
 
(3) 
where )( inn nP kj  refers to the number of paths which pass through node ni and kjnnP refers to the 
total number of shortest paths between node nj and node nk. 
 
3.3 Applying Network Coefficients of Nodes in a Supply Chain for Anti-counterfeiting 
Kuglin and Rosenbaum (2000) are the first who introduced the concept of supply chain network 
which is the network of firms that integrates each other and coordinate together in order to 
produce and deliver finished goods to the end user. The nodes (in the supply chain) refer to 
different supply chain parties which are connected by many links, representing physical activities 
in the supply chain network. Applications of SNA in supply chain analysis are reported in 
Bezuidenhout et al. (2012), Swaminathan et al. (2002) and Lazzarini et al. (2001).  
It is argued that studying and analyzing the network structure that represents a supply chain can 
help to detect suspected counterfeiting parties in the network (Kwok et al., 2010). This can be 
accomplished by using centrality coefficients to analyze the network structure. As discussed in 
Section 3.2 above, degree centrality measures the level of activity, hence the importance and 
potential influence, of a node in the network. However, the attribute only considers the direct ties 
an actor has with others without considering the indirect ones. If one node direct connects to 
many other nodes, but those other nodes, in turn, do not connect to others, the node can only be 
viewed as a central node in a local neighborhood. Certain nodes may be essential to some of the 
transactions even though these nodes are weakly connected as reflected by their relatively low 
value of degree centrality. Closeness centrality and betweenness centrality reflect an individual’s 
capacity to control interactions within a network. 
 
4. Case Study on SNA in Combating Counterfeiting 
4.1 Case Study Background 



kj kj
kj
nn nn
inn
iB P
nP
nC
)(
)(
11 
 
To demonstrate the feasibility of using social network coefficients for nodes in a supply chain 
network as tools to combat counterfeits, stock in / out data of a paper product company (with an 
anonymous name, Midas) were collected and analyzed by SNA.  
Data used in the case study were collected at the Dongguan Plant. The parties featured in the 
network include different functional areas including docking area, four production plants each 
with different functionalities and a warehouse. The physical flow of products in the case 
company follows one of 10 routes listed in Figure 2. The parties involved are Docking Area, 
Production Plants 1 to 4 (PP1 to PP4), and Warehouse. Data on problematic transactions are 
automatically collected by RFID at the case company (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 2 10 Routes of Physical Flow 
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Figure 3 Procedure of Using SNA Centrality Measures to detect Counterfeits 
 
4.2 Network Structure of the Case Study 
In order to analyze the social network structure of Midas, NetMiner (NetMiner, 2006) is 
employed in this case study. NetMiner is a social network visualization and analysis tool which 
allows user to visually and interactively study the network data, and therefore helps user to find 
out the underlying patterns and structure of the network formed. Results of three social network 
coefficients including degree of centrality, closeness of centrality and betweenness of centrality 
are generated and discussed in the following sections. 
4.2.1 Degree of Centrality 
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Degree of centrality measures the level of activity of each node in a network, i.e. the bigger the 
node size, the more active the node is. As shown in Figure 4, warehouse is the most active node, 
which has the highest in-degree of centrality score (i.e. 1). Among all production plants, 
production plant 3 has the highest in-degree of centrality score (i.e. 0.60). Other production 
plants have the same value of in-degree of centrality score (i.e. 0.40) whereas docking area is the 
least active party, in which it has the smallest node and gets the highest out-degree of centrality 
score. In short, the mean of both in-degree of centrality and out-degree of centrality are 0.467; in 
which the in-degree of centrality of both production plant 3 and warehouse are higher than the 
mean, while the out-degree of centrality of docking area, production plant 1 and production plant 
4 are higher than the average value.  
 
  
Figure 4 Social network diagram and vector summary of degree of centrality  
 
4.2.2 Closeness of Centrality  
Closeness centrality measures the ease level of one party to interact with other parties, i.e. the 
bigger the node size, the easiest of one party to interact with other parties. As shown in Figure 5, 
warehouse is the easiest party (i.e. the highest in-degree of centrality score), following by 
production plant 3 (with 0.64 in-degree of centrality score). Production plant 1, 2 and 4 have the 
same node size. The most difficult to interact with other parties is docking area which the node is 
the smallest (i.e. 0 out-closeness of centrality is warehouse). In short, the mean of in-closeness of 
centrality and out-closeness of centrality are 0.482 and 0.48, respectively. The out-closeness of 
centrality of both production plant 3 and warehouse are higher than the mean, while the out-
closeness of centrality of docking area, production plant 1 and production plant 4 are higher than 
the average value.  
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Figure 5 Social network diagram and vector summary of closeness of centrality 
 
 
4.2.3 Betweenness of Centrality 
Betweenness of centrality indicates the level of control between parties over the network, i.e. the 
bigger the node size, the more powerful the node is. Different from the above results, production 
plant 1 is the most powerful node which has the largest ability to control the product flows over 
the network (Figure 6). Production plant 2 and 4 come to the second and is followed by docking 
area, production plant 3 and warehouse. Regarding the highest betweenness of centrality value of 
nodes is 0.050, only half of the nodes have power of control in this supply chain network. The 
betweenness of centrality of production plant 1 is the highest whereas the lowest betweenness of 
centrality is docking, production plant 3 and warehouse. In short, the mean of betweenness of 
centrality is 0.017. The betweenness of centrality of production plant 1, 2 and 4 are higher than 
the mean. Among these three parties, production plant 1 has the greatest power of control over 
the supply chain network.  
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Figure 6 Social network diagram and vector summary of betweenness of centrality 
5. Discussions and Conclusion Remarks 
5.1 Discussions 
5.1.1 Degree of Centrality  
5.1.1.1 In-degree of Centrality 
Other parties seek to directly tie to production plant 3 and warehouse as both of them have a 
higher in-degree of centrality than the mean value. Furthermore, the preference to directly tie to 
warehouse is higher than the production plant 3 as the in-degree of centrality of warehouse is 
higher. As a result, warehouse is the most important and prominent party, following by 
production plant 3. 
5.1.1.2 Out-degree of Centrality 
Docking area, production plant 1 and 4 are able to interact with others and usually act as third-
parties in product exchange among nodes as their out-degree of centrality is higher than the mean 
value. Thus, it is claimed that they are influential parties. Having the out-degree of centrality of 
docking area is the highest, the docking area is the most influential party, and is followed by 
production plant 1 and 4 (i.e. same value of out-degree of centrality). 
5.1.1.3 Summary 
Production docking, production plant 1 and 4 may be the potential parties to spread the 
counterfeiting as they have relative high influential power. Warehouse and production plant 3 
may be the potential parties to receive the counterfeiting as they have relative high interaction on 
receiving problematic products. 
5.1.2  Closeness of centrality  
5.1.2.1 In-closeness of Centrality 
Both warehouse and production plant 3 are the easiest parties to receive products from other 
nodes. They are the most powerful parties in the supply chain as values of their in-closeness of 
centrality are higher than the mean value. Among these two parties, warehouse has the larger 
chance of receiving products from other nodes than production plant 3 as the in-closeness of 
centrality of warehouse is higher. 
5.1.2.2 Out-closeness of Centrality 
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Docking area, production plant 1 and 4 are easy to send products to other parties in a supply 
chain network as their out-closeness of centrality are higher than the mean value. Among these 
three parties, docking area has the largest opportunity to send products to other parties. 
Production plant 1 and 4 has the same opportunity to send goods to other parties which are the 
second highest. 
5.1.2.3 Summary 
Docking area, production plant 1 and 4 may be the potential parties to deliver counterfeits as 
they have relatively high chance to interact with other parties. Warehouse and production plant 3 
may be the potential parties to receive counterfeits as they have relatively high interaction on 
receiving problematic products. 
5.1.3 Betweenness of Centrality 
Production plant 1, 2 and 4 are viewed as movers-and-shakers and the deal-makers that made 
things happen. They are important for the network formation and stratification. Production plant 
1 is the most powerful supply chain parties in this situation. 
5.1.4 Summary of the Results 
The problematic parties can be obtained by finding the high degree of centrality, high closeness 
of centrality and high betweenness of centrality. As production plant 1 and 4 has relatively high 
score in these measures, they have the highest probabilities in supplying counterfeiting sources. 
The possibility of production plant 1 has counterfeiting sources is higher than that of production 
plant 4 as production plant 1 is more powerful in the control of product flows within the supply 
chain network (i.e. higher betweenness of centrality). 
In addition, warehouse and production plant 3 has the highest probabilities in receiving 
counterfeiting sources as they have relatively high score in in-degree of centrality and in-
closeness of centrality. The possibility of warehouse in receiving counterfeiting sources is higher 
as it has higher in-degree of centrality and in-closeness of centrality. In summary, Figure 7 
concludes the paths of conducting counterfeiting sources and spreading along the supply chain. 
To better control the counterfeit distribution within Midas, it is recommended to pay more 
attention to production plant 1 and 4 (which have the higher chance of spreading problematic 
sources). Midas is also suggested to conduct investigation on the four routes of product flows as 
highlighted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Likelihood of paths of counterfeiting 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
This study applies the theory of SNA to the supply chain in order to combat counterfeiting 
problems with accomplishment of two objectives: (i) to introduce the use of an SNA-based 
technique for combating counterfeiting activities; it involves visualization and analysis of the 
logistics flow in a supply chain; and (ii) to demonstrate the feasibility of applying the proposed 
technique and its effectiveness of detecting counterfeiting parties through a case study. It 
evaluates the effectiveness of applying three SNA measures to historical data stored in 
transaction records of a supply chain for detection of likely problematic parties and suspicious 
trails. The social network measures used include degree of centrality, betweenness of centrality, 
The highest probabilities 
of spreading counterfeit 
sources 
The lowest probabilities 
of spreading counterfeit 
sources 
Route (1): 
From production plant 1 to 
warehouse (Path B in Figure 2) 
 
Route (2): 
From production plant 1 to 
production plant 3 (not exist in the 
current situation) 
 
Route (3): 
From production plant 4 to 
warehouse (Path E in Figure 2) 
 
Route (4):  
From production plant 4 to 
production plant 3 (Path I in Figure 
2)  
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and closeness of centrality. Results of the case study reported in this paper indicate that SNA is a 
method that is both effective and efficient for combating sources and channels of counterfeit 
products. 
Comparing with traditional anti-counterfeiting techniques (listed in Table 2), SNA can analyze 
the logistics flow of items and perform as an intelligent detector of the source of counterfeiting 
(such as highlighting plant 1 and 4 as the higher chance of spreading problematic sources in the 
case study). At present, the usual approach to combat counterfeiting is to use the techniques (e.g. 
overt, covert, machine-readable, etc.) to authenticate the end product. However, these solutions 
are not preventive measures against counterfeiting. In contrast, by transforming the data matrix 
into network structure, SNA can simply identify suspicious supply chain parties that are likely to 
be the counterfeit distributor and notify the user if there is anomaly once a possible 
counterfeiting source is being detected (like plant 1 as it out-closeness of centrality are higher 
than the mean value in the case study). With the coefficient measurement of SNA, the attributes 
of the supply chain parties are visualized and presented in graphical and quantitative manner, 
which can further facilitate the analysis and examination of the supply chain parties’ roles 
systemically. For example, the degree of emission and reception of the node can be used to 
determine whether the entity is the distributor or customer of the counterfeit items. 
Although encouraging results have been achieved, there are a number of aspects that need further 
investigations. First, more data samples have to be collected to further ascertain the effectiveness 
of the proposed system in combating counterfeiting. It would be interesting if statistical estimates 
including more risk factors could be incorporated into the network predictions. On the other hand, 
the outputs from SNA could be augmented with rules to explain the rationale used to reach a 
prediction. In this aspect, future work on combining rule extraction techniques can be examined. 
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